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In non-relativistic as well as in special relativistic quantum theory, mass and charge are pure
numbers appearing in various (quantum) operators and admit any values, ie, values for these
quantities are to be prescribed by hand. This is, in a theory of probability, understandable since we
need to assume some intrinsic properties of the object we are calculating the probability about.
Then, if we specify, in some satisfactory manner, mass and charge for a point of the space in a
suitable general-relativistic framework, the quantum theoretical framework could, in principle, be
obtainable within it. Heuristic arguments are presented to show that a natural unification of the
quantum theory and the general theory of relativity is achievable in this manner.
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Difficulties of cognition of physical phenomena
arise only in “constructing” a theory from the re-
sults of experiments and observations of the phys-
ical world, that is, when attempts are made to es-
tablish a consistent cause and effect relation be-
tween them. It might then seem necessary to de-
mand that no concept enter a theory which has
not been experimentally established, at least to
the same degree of accuracy as the experiments
to be explained by that theory. This simple de-
mand is, plainly speaking, quite impossible [1] to
fulfil. It is therefore necessary to introduce various
concepts into a physical theory, without justifying
them rigorously, and then to allow the experiments
to determine the range of their applicability, to
decide at what points their revision is necessary.
Newton’s theory is, now, a classic example of this
methodology of Physics.
Newton’s ideas are geometric [2] conceptions of
specific mathematical structures or fields (scalar,
vector, tensor functions) defined over the metri-
cally flat (Euclidean) 3-continuum and the laws of
their spatio-temporal transformations. The under-
lying metrically flat 3-continuum admits the same
Euclidean metric structure before and after the
(galilean) coordinate transformations. This ever-
flat 3-continuum is, in this sense, an absolute space
in Newton’s theory. Furthermore, in Newton’s the-
ory, the physical laws for these quantities are math-
ematical statements form-invariant under galilean
coordinate transformations.
Various (newtonian) mathematical methods, of
Laplace, Lagrange, Euler, Hamilton, Jacobi, Pois-
son and others [3], hold for these newtonian fields
definable on the metrically flat 3-continuum and
are consistent with the fact that the underlying flat
3-continuum admits the same metric structure be-
fore and after the spatio-temporal transformations
of these fields. This overall is, truly, the sense of
any theory being newtonian.
The spatio-temporal (galilean) transformations
under which the newtonian laws are form-invariant
are, as opposed to general, specific transforma-
tions of coordinates. Newton’s theory also attaches
physical meaning to the space coordinates and to
the time coordinate. In this theory, the space co-
ordinate describes the physical distance separating
physical bodies and the time coordinate describes
the reading of a physical clock.
In addition to the above, the (newtonian) tem-
poral coordinate has universally the same value for
all the spatial locations, ie, all synchronized clocks
at different spatial locations show and maintain the
same time. In other words, the newtonian time co-
ordinate is the absolute physical time.
The basic concept of this theoretical framework
is, of course, Newton’s point-mass that moves
along a one-dimensional curve of the metrically
ever-flat 3-continuum. In these above physical as-
sociations of the newtonian theory, it is always tac-
itly assumed that the interaction of a measuring
instrument (observer) and the object (a particle
whose physical parameters are being measured) is
negligibly small or that the effects of this interac-
tion can be eliminated from the results of observa-
tions to obtain, as accurately as desired, the values
of these parameters [4] [18].
An issue closely related to the above one is that
of the causality. Given initial data, Newton’s the-
ory predicts the values of its variables of the point-
mass exactly and, hence, assumes strictly causal
development of its physical world.
2But, the question arises of zero rest-mass parti-
cles, if any, and Newton’s theory cannot describe
motion of such particles for obvious reasons:
~a =
~F
m
where ~a is the acceleration, ~F is the force caus-
ing that acceleration of a newtonian particle of an
inertial rest-mass m. Clearly, acceleration has no
meaning for m = 0 in the above equation of the
newtonian second law of motion. This above in-
ability is an indication of the limitations of the
newtonian theoretical framework.
Then, if a zero rest-mass particle were to exist
in reality, and nothing in Newton’s theory prevents
this, it is immediately clear that we need to “ex-
tend” various newtonian conceptions.
Now, light displays phenomena such as umbra-
penumbra, diffraction, interference, polarization
etc. But, Newton’s corpuscular theory needs un-
natural, non-universal, inter-particle forces to ex-
plain these phenomena. That light displays phe-
nomena needing unnatural explanations in New-
ton’s theory could, with hindsight, then be inter-
preted to mean that light needs to be treated as a
zero rest-mass particle.
Furthermore, as Lorentz had first realized very
clearly, the sources of the newtonian forces are
the singularities of the corresponding fields defined
on the flat 3-continuum. Although unsatisfactory,
this nature of the newtonian framework causes no
problems of mathematical nature since this distinc-
tion is maintainable within the formalism, ie, well-
defined mathematical procedures for handling this
distinction are possible.
Revisions of newtonian concepts were necessary
by the beginning of the 20th century. Firstly, ef-
forts to reconcile some experimental results with
newtonian concepts failed and associated concep-
tions led Einstein to Special Theory of Relativity
[5]. Secondly, some other experiments, in partic-
ular, those related to the wave-particle duality of
radiation and matter, both, led to non-relativistic
quantum theory [1].
The methods of Non-Relativistic Quantum Field
Theory [6] are also similar of nature to the above
newtonian methods in that these consider quantum
fields definable on the metrically flat 3-continuum.
For these fields of quantum character, we are of
course required to modify the newtonian mathe-
matical methods. The Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg for-
malism achieves precisely this. Quantum consid-
erations only change the nature of the mathemat-
ical (field) structure definable on the underlying
metrically flat 3-continuum. That is, differences in
the newtonian and the quantum fields are math-
ematically entirely describable as such. But, the
metrically flat 3-continuum is also, in the above
sense, an absolute space in these non-relativistic
quantum considerations.
Now, importantly, the “source properties” of
physical matter are differently treated in the non-
relativistic quantum field theory than in Newton’s
theory. Mass and electric charge of a physical body
appear as pure numbers, to be prescribed by hand
for a point of the metrically flat 3-continuum, in
Schro¨dinger’s equation or, equivalently, in Heisen-
berg’s operators. Quantum theory then provides
us the probability of the location of the mass and
the charge values in certain specific region of the
underlying metrically flat 3-continuum. Also, the
numerical values of the newtonian variables of the
point, such as its linear momentum, energy, angu-
lar momentum etc. are prescribed the correspond-
ing probabilities.
However, certain physical variables of the new-
tonian mass-point acquire discrete values in the
mathematical formalism of the quantum theory.
This discreteness of certain variables is the gen-
uine characteristic of the quantum theory and is a
significant departure from their continuous values
in Newton’s theory.
This quantum theory is fundamentally a theory
that divides the physical world into two parts, a
part that is a system being observed and a part
that does the observation. Therefore, quantum
theory always refers to an observer who is external
to the system under observation. The results of
the observation, of course, depend in detail on just
how this division is made.
But, it must be recognized that classical con-
cepts are not completely expelled from the physi-
cal considerations in the quantum theory. On the
contrary, in Bohr’s words, it is decisive to recog-
nize that, however far the phenomena transcend
the scope of classical physical explanation, the ac-
count of all evidence must be expressed in classical
terms [7]. This applies in spite of the fact that clas-
sical (newtonian) mechanics does not account for
the observations of the microphysical world. (Bohr
offers “complementarity of (classical) concepts” as
an explanation for this.)
We then also note here that it is not possi-
ble to treat zero rest mass particles in the non-
relativistic quantum theory. As is well known [6],
Schro¨dinger’s equation or Heisenberg’s operators
of this theory are meaningful only when mass is
non-vanishing:[
− ~2
∇2
2m
+ V
]
Ψ = ı~
∂
∂t
Ψ
where Ψ is Schro¨dinger’s Ψ-function and other
symbols have their usual meaning.
3Clearly, the relevant operators are meaningful
only for m 6= 0. Essentially, it is the same limita-
tion as that of Newton’s theory. Non-relativistic
quantum field theory cannot therefore describe
phenomena displayed by light.
But, here, a physical body is described as a non-
singular point-particle, not as an extended object.
That is, mass and electric charge appearing herein
are non-singularly defined only for a point of the
metrically always-flat 3-continuum.
Now, with Maxwell’s electromagnetism [8], we
realize that the particle of electromagnetic radia-
tion has zero rest-mass - follows from the special
relativistic mass-variation with velocity. Then, in
essence, the theory of special relativity enlarges the
galilean group of transformations of the metrically
flat 3-continuum and time to the Lorentz group of
transformations of the metrically flat 3-continuum
and time, which is also treatable as a metrically
flat Minkowski-continuum [19].
Lorentz transformations keep Minkowski metric
the same. Then, special relativistic laws for elec-
tromagnetic fields (mathematical structures on the
metrically flat 4-continuum), Maxwell’s equations,
are mathematical statements form-invariant under
Lorentz transformations.
With Maxwell’s equations, we have the “spe-
cial relativistic laws of motion” for the sources
and Maxwell’s equations for the (electromagnetic)
fields. Then, as long as we treat the sources and
the fields separately, problems of mathematical na-
ture do not arise since well-defined mathematical
procedures exist to handle these concepts.
Standard mathematical methods then permit us
again considerations of classical fields on the metri-
cally flat 4-continuum [3]. The “newtonian” math-
ematical methods of Hamilton-Jacobi-Poisson hold
also for them, now in 4-dimensions, and are con-
sistent with the fact that the flat 4-continuum ad-
mits the same metric structure before and after the
Lorentz transformations of these fields.
This above is, now, the sense of any theory be-
ing classical. The underlying metrically flat 4-
spacetime is then an absolute 4-space in the sense
[20] described herein.
It may now be noted that, for zero rest mass
particles, we can ascribe vanishing rest mass to a
point of the space (or the spacetime manifold):
E2 = p2 +m2
A point of the space then has m = 0 when E = p
and such a point necessarily moves with the speed
of light. Then, the Lorentz group allows form-
invariant Maxwell’s equations describing massless
electromagnetic radiation.
The Lorentz transformations under which spe-
cial relativistic laws are form-invariant are specific
coordinate transformations. Further, the concepts
of measuring rods and clocks are clearly subject
to critical examination and it then becomes clear
that the ordinary newtonian these concepts involve
the tacit assumption that there exist, in principle,
signals that are propagated with an infinite speed.
Then, as shown by Einstein, the absolute character
of time is now lost completely: initially synchro-
nized clocks at different spatial locations do not
keep the same time-value.
However, like with Newton’s theory, coordinates
have a direct physical meaning in special theory of
relativity: spatial coordinates represent the length
of a physical measuring rod and temporal coor-
dinate represents the time-duration measured by
a physical clock. Although it is the same associ-
ation of physical character, the Lorentz transfor-
mations constitute significant departure from the
newtonian concepts since time is no longer the ab-
solute time in special relativity.
But, in such (classical) special relativistic con-
siderations, it is always assumed that the effects
of the interaction of a measuring instrument (ob-
server) and the object can be eliminated from the
results of observations to obtain, as accurately as
desired, the values of various parameters of the ob-
ject [21]. This is exactly as it was in Newton’s the-
ory. Hence, (classical) special relativity assumes
strict causality.
Now, quantum fields require suitable equations
that are form-invariant under the Lorentz trans-
formations to describe quanta moving close to
the speed of light in vacuum. These quantum
fields are, once again, mathematical structures de-
finable on the metrically ever-flat 4-dimensional
(Minkowski) spacetime.
Methods of special relativistic quantum field
theory [9] then handle such quantum fields on
the metrically ever-flat 4-continuum admitting a
Minkowskian metric. For quantum fields, we need
to “modify” the classical newtonian mathemati-
cal methods. These are appropriate generaliza-
tions of those of Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg methods.
This, the Dirac-Schwinger-Tomonaga formalism
[9], achieves for the metrically flat minkowskian 4-
continuum that which the Schro¨dinger-Heisenberg
formalism achieves for the newtonian 3-space and
time. Then, the differences in the classical and
the quantum fields are mathematically entirely de-
scribable as such. Non-relativistic results are re-
coverable when the velocities are small compared
to the speed of light.
However, the underlying Minkowski spacetime
does not change under the (Lorentz) transfor-
mations keeping the quantum equations form-
invariant and is also, in the earlier sense, an ab-
solute 4-space here.
4Once again, a physical body is represented in
these special relativistic quantum considerations
by ascribing in non-singular sense the mass and
the charge as pure numbers to points of the
Minkowski 4-continuum in the corresponding oper-
ators. The special relativistic quantum theory then
provides us the probability of the spatial location
and temporal instant of the mass and the charge
values in a region of the Minkowski 4-continuum,
for all velocities limited by the speed of light in
vacuum. The numerical values of other variables
of the physical body are also prescribed the corre-
sponding probabilities.
Other massless particles, eg, neutrinos, are also
allowed in the special relativistic quantum field
theory due to the group enlargement from that of
the galilean group to the Lorentz group of transfor-
mations. It is this group enlargement that permits
form-invariant Dirac equation [9]. This group en-
largement also permits us the theory of massive
spin 1
2
fermions: as are electrons.
However, as noted before, there is nothing spe-
cial about the 4-dimensional metrically ever-flat
spacetime manifold and the same physics can be
described in a 3 + 1 fashion without difficulties of
mathematical or physical nature.
But, there cannot be any possibility of explain-
ing the origin of “mass” as well as of “charge” in
this, quantum or not, special relativistic theory,
since these properties of a physical body are the
pure numbers to be prescribed by hand for the
corresponding (classical or quantum) mathemati-
cal description [22]. In other words, it is only after
we have specified the values of mass and charge
for a source particle that we can obtain, from the
mathematical formalisms of these theories, its fur-
ther dynamics based on the given (appropriate)
initial data. Hence, the values of mass and charge
are not obtainable in these theories.
Clearly, therefore, some new developments are
needed here to account for the “origin” of such
fundamental properties of matter. It is then also
clear that the newtonian and the special relativistic
frameworks, both, are not sufficiently general to
form the basis for the entire physics.
Now, Lorentz had clearly recognized [10] (p.
155) the notion of the inertia of the electromagnetic
field that follows from Maxwell’s theory of electro-
magnetism: Maxwell’s theory shows that the elec-
tromagnetic field possesses inertia which is not the
same as that of its source particle.
Lorentz then had a clear conception that iner-
tia (opposition of a physical body to a change in
its state of motion) could possess origin in the field
conception. Just as a person in a moving crowd ex-
periences opposition to a change in motion, a par-
ticle (region of concentrated field) moving in a sur-
rounding field experiences opposition to a change
in its state of motion. This is Lorentz’s conception
of the field-origin of inertia.
Now, firstly, the distinction between the source
and the field must necessarily be obliterated in any
formulation of this conception. In other words, a
field is the only basic concept and a particle is a
derived concept here. Secondly, the mathemati-
cal formulation of this conception is also required
to be intrinsically nonlinear. Basically, in this con-
ception, the field cannot refer to some linear math-
ematical structure defined on the non-dynamical
metrically ever-flat continuum.
Clearly, solutions of linear equations, eg, those
of Maxwell’s electromagnetism, obey superposition
principle, and required number of solutions can be
superposed to obtain the solution for any assumed
field configuration. But, the sources generating the
assumed field configuration continue to be the sin-
gularities of the field. Hence, there are no means
here of obliterating the distinction between sources
and field since the sources are the singularities of
the field they generate.
Some non-linear field equations could conceiv-
ably possess singularity-free solutions for the field.
Solutions of such (non-linear) field equations would
also not obey the superposition principle. Then,
one could hope that these (non-linear) equations
for the field would permit some appropriate treat-
ment of source particles as singularity-free regions
of concentrated field energy.
An important question is now that of the appro-
priate (non-linear) field equations of this overall
nature, of obtaining these equations without ven-
turing into meaningless arbitrariness. In fact, this
question is not just that of the appropriate nonlin-
ear (partial) differential equations that could serve
as the field equations. Rather, this question is of
some appropriate non-linear mathematical formal-
ism that need not even possess the character of
non-linear (partial) differential equations for the
field as a mathematical structure on the underly-
ing continuum. (It is also the issue [23] of whether
the most fundamental formalism of physics could
have a mathematical structure other than that of
the (partial) differential equations.)
Historically, there did not exist with Lorentz any
physical guidelines for getting to these non-linear
field equations. This, very difficult and lengthy,
path to these non-linear equations was completely
developed by Einstein alone.
Then, Einstein formulated [24] his ideas for a 4-
continuum. The pivotal point of his formulation
of the relevant ideas is the equivalence of inertial
and gravitational mass of a physical body, a fact
known since Newton’s times but which remained
only an assumption of Newton’s theory.
5On the basis of the equivalence principle, Ein-
stein then provided us the “curved 4-geometry”
as a “physically realizable” entity. His field equa-
tions provide then a way of realizing these concep-
tions of a curved geometry physically. Einstein’s
(makeshift) field equations of this General The-
ory of Relativity are form-invariant under general
(spacetime) coordinate transformations - the prin-
ciple of general covariance [11].
To arrive at his formulation of the general theory
of relativity, Einstein raised [13] (p. 69) the follow-
ing two questions: Of which mathematical type are
the variables (functions of the coordinates) which
permit the expression of the physical properties of
the space (“structure”)? Only after that: Which
equations are satisfied by those variables?
He then proceeded to develop this theory in two
stages, namely, those dealing with
(a) pure gravitational field, and
(b) general field (in which quantities correspond-
ing somehow to the electromagnetic field oc-
cur, too).
The situation (a), the pure gravitational field, is
characterized by a symmetric (Riemannian) metric
(tensor of rank two) for which the Riemann curva-
ture tensor does not vanish.
For the situation (b), Einstein [13] (p. 73) then
set up “preliminary equations” to investigate the
usefulness of the basic ideas of general relativity:
R
ij
−
1
2
Rg
ij
= − κT
ij
where R
ij
denotes the Ricci tensor, R denotes the
Ricci scalar, κ denotes a proportionality constant
and T
ij
denotes the energy-momentum tensor of
matter. In these equations, the energy-momentum
tensor does not contain the energy (or inertia) of
the pure gravitational field.
In this connection, Einstein expressed [13] (p.
75) his judgement and concerns about these pre-
liminary equations as: The right side is a for-
mal condensation of all things whose comprehen-
sion in the sense of a field theory is still problem-
atic. Not for a moment, of course, did I doubt that
this formulation was merely a makeshift in order
to give the general principle of relativity a prelim-
inary closed expression. For it was essentially not
anything more than a theory of the gravitational
field, which was somewhat artificially isolated from
a total field of as yet unknown structure.
This general theory of relativity essentially frees
Physics from the association of physical meaning to
coordinates and coordinate differences, an assump-
tion implicit in Newton’s theory and in special rel-
ativity. The formulation of Einstein’s (makeshift)
field equations however attaches physical meaning
to the invariant distance of the curved spacetime
geometry and considers it to be a physically ex-
actly measurable quantity.
Through these equations, geometric properties
of the spacetime are supposed to be determined
by the physical matter. In turn, the spacetime ge-
ometry is supposed to tell the physical matter how
to move. That is, the geodesics of the spacetime
geometry are supposed to provide the law of mo-
tion of the physical matter.
Now, we may imagine [11] a small perturbation
of the background spacetime geometry and obtain
equations governing these perturbations. We may
also consider [11] quantum fields on the unchanging
background spacetime geometry.
Then, such methods (of perturbative analysis
and also of the Quantum Field Theory in Curved
Spacetime) are quite similar of nature to methods
adopted for either the flat 3-continuum or the flat
4-continuum in that these consider “mathematical
fields” definable on the fixed and metrically curved
4-continuum. Keeping the nature of mathemati-
cal (field) structures the same, these considerations
only change the 4-space which is now a metrically
curved “absolute” 4-continuum.
But, as far as Lorentz’s or Einstein’s concep-
tions are concerned, these above considerations of a
quantum field theory in a curved spacetime or per-
turbations of a curved spacetime geometry are, evi-
dently, not self-consistent since matter fields must
affect the background spacetime geometry. But,
these are not the real issues here.
Without going into further details of its formal-
ism, we note that General Theory of Relativity em-
bodies another significant departure from newto-
nian concepts since only the concept of coincidence
in spacetime is accepted uncritically in it [1]. At
this point, it is then important to note that this
space-time coincidence is usally taken to be that
of a physical kind. That is, it is usually assumed
that the time coordinate is measurable exactly and
so are the spatial coordinates measurable exactly
in a measuring arrangement.
But, the interaction between observer and object
is then assumed to be negligibly small or that its
effects can be eliminated from the results of any
measurement. This is then the situation with the
standard formulation of general relativity, that of
Einstein’s (makeshift) field equations, even when it
has finite speeds for signal propagations. Clearly,
these two are then unrelated issues.
But, in microscopic phenomena, the interaction
between observer and object causes uncontrollable
and large changes in the system being observed.
Then, every experiment performed to determine
some numerical quantity renders the knowledge
6of some others illusory, since the uncontrollable
changes caused to the observed system alter the
values of these other quantities.
Therefore, Einstein’s field equations cannot be
applied to microscopic phenomena and, hence, in
general, may only serve to approximate the average
behavior of physical phenomena. This much is,
perhaps, generally recognized.
However, what has mostly gone unnoticed is the
fact that Einstein’s approach to his vacuum as well
as (makeshift) field equations with matter is beset
with numerous internal contradictions of serious
physical nature [12].
Firstly, Einstein’s vacuum field equations are en-
tirely unsatisfactory [12] since these are field equa-
tions for the pure gravitational field without even
a possibility of the equations of motion for the
sources of that field.
Certainly, matter cannot be any part of the the-
ory of the vacuum or the pure gravitational field.
Then, there cannot be physical objects in consid-
erations of the pure gravitational field, except as
sources of such fields. Therefore, it obviously does
not make any sense whatsoever to say that the
geodesics of such a spacetime, geometry describ-
ing a pure gravitational field, provide the law of
motion for the material sources.
Now, a material particle is necessarily a space-
time singularity of the pure gravitational field and,
hence, mathematically, no equations of motion for
it are possible. Then, we have only equations for
the pure field but no equations of motion for the
sources creating those fields.
But, the vacuum field equations alone are not
enough to draw any conclusions of physical nature.
Without the laws for the motions of sources gener-
ating the (vacuum) fields, we have no means of as-
certaining or establishing the “causes” of motions
of sources. No conclusions of physical nature are
therefore permissible in this situation and, thus,
the vacuum field equations cannot lead us to phys-
ically verifiable predictions.
[Note that this above situation is markedly dif-
ferent from that with special relativity. In special
relativity, the background geometry does not pos-
sess any geometric singularity at any location, but
only the (mathematical) fields defined on this ge-
ometry can be singular. Then, similar to Newton’s
theory, situations in special relativity lead us to
physically testable predictions.]
Secondly, Einstein’s (makeshift) field equations
with matter are also not satisfactory [12] from the
physical point of view. Recall here that the energy-
momentum tensor deals with density and fluxes of
particles. Then, unless a definition of what consti-
tutes a particle is, a-priori, available to us, we can-
not even construct the energy-momentum tensor
for the physical matter. Since a spacetime singu-
larity cannot represent a physical particle, the con-
cept of a particle is not available to us in Einstein’s
approach to makeshift field equations of general
relativity. Thus, the energy-momentum tensor is
not any well-defined concept and, with it, the field
equations become ill-posed.
What is of definite (historical too) importance
is the fact that Einstein had recognized many of
these problems of physical nature [12] with his
(makeshift) approach. Of relevance here are his
penetrating remarks [13] (p. 675): Maxwell’s the-
ory of the electric field remained a torso, because it
was unable to set up laws for the behavior of elec-
tric density, without which there can, of course, be
no such thing as an electromagnetic field. Anal-
ogously the general theory of relativity furnished
then a field theory of gravitation, but no theory
of the field-creating masses. (These remarks pre-
suppose it as self-evident that a field theory may
not contain any singularities, i.e., any positions
or parts in space in which the field-laws are not
valid.)
It is also of relevance to note here that Einstein’s
numerous attempts at unified field theory did not
impress others [25]. For example, Pauli demanded
[10] (p. 347) to know what had become of the per-
ihelion of Mercury, the bending of light etc. Ein-
stein was not overly bothered that there were no
good answer to these questions in his unified field
theory. He wrote “Nearly all the colleagues react
sourly to the theory because it puts again in doubt
the earlier general relativity.” (Was he ready to
completely abandon his earlier general relativity?)
The cases mentioned by Pauli are, clearly, the
“pathological cases” in which related mathemati-
cal expressions for the explanations of concerned
phenomena “agree” with observations. But, for
the reasons mentioned earlier, the “correct expla-
nations” of the same cannot be those provided by
the makeshift field equations [12]. It is decisive to
recognize this fact.
In Einstein’s conceptions of dynamic curved ge-
ometry, the continuum is no longer only an “inert”
stage for the physical fields, different mathematical
structures on the continuum. The defining struc-
ture of the continuum must change as these phys-
ical structures defined on it change. In a sense,
therefore, the defining structure and the physical
fields need to be inseparable in any mathematical
formulation of these ideas.
Then, to reemphasize the same point once again,
we reiterate that, as per Einstein’s these concep-
tions of curved geometry and matter, the metric
structure, the defining structure of the continuum,
must change as the physical fields on it change.
Therefore, what we need here is some mathemati-
7cal formulation of these ideas in which the physical
fields and the metric structure become essentially
inseparable from each other. (But, this above is
clearly not the situation with Einstein’s makeshift
field equations with matter since matter-free equa-
tions are obtainable from them [26])
Now, as per Einstein’s conceptions, the space is
to be indistinguishable from physical bodies. Thus,
properties of physical bodies are the properties of
the space and vice versa. As any physical body
changes, these properties change, it then also being
a change in the structure of the space.
The question is now of suitable mathematical
description of these (Einstein’s and Descartes’s)
conceptions [5]. On very general grounds, such a
mathematical description can be expected to pos-
sess the following characteristics.
Clearly, in this description, motion of a physical
body will be a change in the structure of the space.
Cartan’s volume-form should then be well-defined
at every spatial location. A point of space could
also be prescribed, in some suitable non-singular
sense, the inertia, electric charge etc. Then, such
a point of the space is describable as a point par-
ticle in the newtonian sense. We may also look at
any extended physical body in the newtonian, non-
singular, sense of a point particle possessing vari-
ous properties of a physical body. Thus, physical
bodies should everywhere in space be describable
as singularity-free.
The issue is of incorporating time in this frame-
work and, the temporal evolution of “points of
space” is a mathematically well-definable concept
- as a dynamical system.
Then, concepts under consideration could be re-
alizable in some mathematically well-defined for-
malism that deals with dynamical systems defined
on continuum as the underlying set.
Such a description then also follows the principle
of general covariance: the laws regarding physical
objects in it are based on the arbitrary transfor-
mations of coordinates of the underlying space and
also on time as an essentially arbitrary parameter
of the dynamical system.
The question now is of suitable mathematical
structure on the space that allows us the associ-
ation of physical properties of material objects to
the points of the space. Furthermore, the question
is also of defining in a natural manner the bound-
ary of any physical object.
A physical object has associated with it vari-
ous (fundamental) physical properties, eg, (rest)
energy. Then, the adjacent objects clearly sep-
arate by boundaries at which the spatial deriva-
tive(s) of that property under consideration, (eg,
rest energy), change(s) the sign.
But, any physical object is some region of space.
Therefore, some suitable structure on the space
must, as per these conceptions, then possess a sim-
ilar property of its derivative changing its sign at
a boundary of a physical object.
It then also follows that a physical property
can, essentially, be specified independently for each
spatial direction since these directions are to be
treated as independent of each other. This is an
immediate consequence of the fact that, as per Ein-
stein’s conceptions, properties of the space are also
the properties of physical objects.
Now, the space (continuum) is characterizable
by “distance” separating its points. Suitable “dis-
tance” function can then be expected [27] to pos-
sess the property of its derivative(s) changing sign
across boundaries separating regions of space cor-
responding to separated objects. This suitable dis-
tance function then, mathematically, becomes a
pseudo-metric function on the space, remaining a
metric function within a region.
An obvious question is then of suitable such
pseudo-metric function on the underlying space,
evidently, a continuum.
At the present juncture, we seek an answer to
this question in the properties of physical matter.
Then, we note that physical matter can be assem-
bled (and reassembled) to produce (another form
of) physical matter. Since there is to be “no space
without physical matter” in the present situation,
it then follows that the underlying space must be
mass-scale independent and, hence, spatial-scale
independent as well. This, in general, leads us to
a space admitting three linearly independent (spa-
tial) homothetic Killing vectors [14].
Consider therefore a three-dimensional pseudo-
Riemannian manifold, denoted as B, admitting a
pseudo-metric [14]:
dℓ2 = P ′
2
Q2R2 dx2 + P 2Q¯2R2 dy2
+ P 2Q2R˜2 dz2 (1)
where we have P ≡ P (x), Q ≡ Q(y), R ≡ R(z)
and P ′ = dP/dx, Q¯ = dQ/dy, R˜ = dR/dz. The
vanishing of any of these spatial functions is a cur-
vature singularity, and constancy (over a range) is
a degeneracy of (1).
A choice of functions, say, Po, Qo, Ro is a specific
distribution of “physical properties” in the space
of (1). As some “region” of physical properties
“moves” in the space, we have the original set of
functions changing to the “new” set of correspond-
ing functions, say, P1, Q1, R1.
Clearly, we are considering the isometries of (1)
while considering “motion” of this kind. Then, we
will remain within the group of the isometries of (1)
by restricting to the triplets of nowhere-vanishing
8functions P , Q, R. We also do not consider any
degenerate situations for (1).
If we denote by ℓ the pseudo-metric function
corresponding to (1), then (B, ℓ) is an uncount-
able, separable, complete pseudo-metric space. If
we denote by d, a metric function canonically [15]
obtainable from the pseudo-metric (1), then the
space (B, d) is an uncountable, separable, complete
metric space. If Γ denotes the metric topology in-
duced by d onB, then (B,Γ) is a Polish topological
space. Further, we also obtain a Standard Borel
Space (B,B) where B denotes the Borel σ-algebra
of the subsets of B, the smallest one containing all
the open subsets of (B,Γ) [16].
Since (B,B) is a standard Borel space, any mea-
surable, one-one map of B onto itself is a Borel au-
tomorphism. Therefore, the Borel automorphisms
of (B,B), forming a group, are natural for us to
consider here.
But, the pseudo-metric (1) is a metric function
on certain “open” sets, to be called the P-sets, of
its Polish topology Γ. A P-set of (B, d) is therefore
never a singleton subset, {{x} : x ∈ B}, of the
space B. Note also that every open set of (B,Γ) is
not a P-set of (B, d).
Any two P-sets, Pi and Pj , i, j ∈ N, i 6= j,
are, consequently, pairwise disjoint subsets of B.
Also, each P-set is, in own right, an uncountable,
complete, separable, metric space.
Evidently, a P-set is the mathematically simplest
form of “localized” physical properties in the space
B and we call it a physical particle. This suggests
that suitable mathematical properties of a P-set,
as well as those of a collection of P-sets, can be the
properties of physical matter.
Now, (Lebesgue) measures on measurable sub-
sets of a standard Borel space are natural for us
to consider here. Also, signed measures are de-
finable on measurable sets. Signed measures then
provide us the notion of the “polarity” of certain
properties. Measures could then represent physical
propoerties in the present formalism.
Now, P-sets, also open in Γ, are measurable sub-
sets of B. Thus, we associate with every attribute
of a physical body, a suitable class of (Lebesgue)
measures on such P-sets. Hence, a P-set is a phys-
ical particle, always an extended body, since a P-set
cannot be a singleton subset of B.
Clearly, various physical properties (measures)
change only when the region of space (P-set)
changes. Thus, a region of space (P-set) and phys-
ical properties (the measures on P-sets) have been
amalgamated into one thing here.
Moreover, a given measure can be integrated
over the underlying P-set in question. The inte-
gration procedure is always a well-defined one for
obvious mathematical reasons. The value of such
an integral provides then an “averaged quantity
characteristic of a P-set” under question. It is then
evident that this “average” is a property of the en-
tire P-set under consideration and, hence, of every
point of that P-set.
A point of the P-set is then thinkable as hav-
ing these averaged properties of the P-set and, in
this precise non-singular sense, is thinkable as a
(newtonian) point-particle possessing those aver-
aged properties. In this non-singular sense, points
of the space B become point particles.
In essence, we have, in a non-singular manner,
then “recovered” the (newtonian) notion of a point
particle from that of our notion of a field - the
underlying continuum B.
Further, the “location” of this point-particle will
be indeterminate over the size of that P-set be-
cause the averaged property is also the property
of every point of the set under consideration. The
individuality of a point particle is then that of the
corresponding P-set.
Now, we call as an object a collection of P-sets.
But, a P-set is a particle. Therefore, an object is a
collection of particles. Measures can also be inte-
grated over such objects. Such integrated measures
are then the property of every point of that object
under consideration and a point of B in the object
is then also thinkable as a (newtonian) point par-
ticle with these physical properties [28]. Location
of such a point particle is then indeterminate over
the size of that object.
Then, the points of the underlying space B can
also be attributed the physical properties averaged
over the size of an object. Hence, we can also rep-
resent an object under consideration as a (newto-
nian) point particle.
Therefore, we have the required characteristics
of Descartes’s and Einstein’s conceptions incorpo-
rated in the present formalism. Clearly, we have
then the non-singular notion of a point particle
as well as that of replacing any extended phys-
ical body by such a non-singular point particle.
Furthermore, physical bodies are also represented
as non-singular regions of the space B. Then,
the union of the space and the physical objects
is clearly perceptible here.
As any Borel automorphism of the underlying
space B changes a P-set/object, the integrated
properties may also change and, hence, the (ini-
tial) particle(s) may change into other particle(s),
if integrated measures change.
Now, the Hausdorff metric [15] provides the dis-
tance separating P-sets and also the distance sep-
arating objects. This distance bewteen sets will,
henceforth, be called the physical distance between
P-sets or objects (as extended physical bodies) be-
cause “measurement in the physical sense” can be
9expected to yield only this quantity as distance
separating physical objects.
Measure-preserving Borel automorphisms of the
space B then “transform” a P-set maintaining its
characteristic classes of (Lebesgue) measures, that
is, its physical properties.
Non-measure-preserving Borel automorphisms
change the characteristic classes of Lebesgue mea-
sures (physical properties) of a P-set while “trans-
forming” it. Evidently, such considerations also
apply to objects.
Then, a periodic or periodic component of Borel
automorphism [16] will lead to an oscillatory mo-
tion of a P-set or an object while preserving or not
preserving its measures.
Therefore, an object undergoing periodic motion
is a physically realizable clock in the present frame-
work. Such an object undergoing oscillatory mo-
tion then “displays” the time-parameter of the cor-
responding (periodic) Borel automorphism since
the period of the motion of such an object is pre-
cisely the period of the corresponding Borel auto-
morphism. (It is however not the “observed” time
since we ‘need’ here the means to ‘observe’ the pe-
riodic motion of the object.)
Then, within the present formalism, ameasuring
clock is therefore any P-set or an object undergoing
periodic motion. A P-set or an object can also be
used as a measuring rod.
Therefore, in the present theoretical framework,
measuring apparatuses, measuring rods and mea-
suring clocks, are on par with every other thing
that the formalism intends to treat.
A Borel automorphism of (B,B) may change the
physical distance resulting into “relative motion”
of objects. We also note here that the sets invariant
under the specific Borel automorphism are charac-
teristic of that automorphism. Hence, such sets
will then have their distance “fixed” under that
Borel automorphism and will be stationary rela-
tive to each other.
Now, in a precise sense, it follows that the posi-
tion of the point-particle (of integrated characteris-
tics of its P-set) is “determinable” more and more
accurately as the size of that P-set gets smaller
and smaller. But, complete localization of a point
particle is not permissible here since a P-set or an
object is never a singleton subset of B. The lo-
cation of the point particle is then always “inde-
terminate” to the extent of the size of its P-set.
This is an intrinsic indeterminacy that cannot be
overcome in any manner.
Hence, a joint manifestation of Borel automor-
phisms of the space (B,B) and the association, as
a point particle, of integrated measures definable
on a P-set or an object with the points of B is
a candidate reason behind Heisenberg’s indetermi-
nacy relations since indeterminacy of location of a
point-particle is intrinsic here.
In this context, we therefore note that any exper-
imental arrangement to determine a physical prop-
erty of a P-set or an object is based on some specific
“arrangement” of P-sets and involves correspond-
ing Borel automorphisms of B affecting those P-
sets or objects.
For example, Heisenberg’s microscope attempt-
ing the determination of the location of an electron
involves the collision of a photon with an electron.
It therefore has an associated Borel automorphism
producing the motion of a specific P-set, a photon.
Although we have not specified the sense in which
a P-set can be a photon, it is clear that the Borel
automorphism causing its motion will also affect
an electron as a P-set.
Thus, a P-set “transforms” as a result of our
efforts to “determine any of its characteristic mea-
sures” since these “efforts or experimental arrange-
ments” are also Borel automorphisms, not neces-
sarily the members of the class of Borel automor-
phisms keeping invariant that P-set (as well as the
class of its characteristic measures).
Hence, a Borel automorphism (experimental ar-
rangement) “determining” a characteristic mea-
sure of a P-set changes, in effect, the very quan-
tity that it is trying to determine. This peculiarity
then leads to Heisenberg’s (corresponding) inde-
terminacy relation.
As another example, consider a physical clock.
In the present context, it is an object undergo-
ing periodic motion, with the period of its motion
being exactly that of the corresponding periodic
Borel automorphism. However, to be able to de-
termine this time period of the physical clock, we
need the “interaction” of another agency, say, a
photon, with the clock, and that interaction is an-
other Borel automorphism. This “interaction” of
observing agency causes the “change” in the period
of the clock and, hence, leads to the corresponding
indeterminacy relation.
Once again, we have not specified the sense in
which a P-set can be a photon here. However, it
follows that this “sense” is precisely that of mea-
sures definable on a P-set of the underlying contin-
uum space B. Here, we therefore need to “define
clearly” the classes of measures corresponding to
a photon and an electron and, we have obviously
not done that here.
However, irrespective of this obvious question of
only mathematical nature, it is clearly possible to
intuitively explain [17] the origin of Heisenberg’s
indeterminacy relations. The formalism of dynam-
ical systems on the Borel space B then provides
us therefore an “origin” of Heisenberg’s indetermi-
nacy relations. This is in complete contrast to their
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probabilistic origin as advocated by the standard
formalism of the quantum theory.
Notice now that, in the present considerations,
we began with none of the fundamental considera-
tions of the concept of a quantum. But, one of the
basic characteristics of the conception of a quan-
tum, Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, emerged
out of the present formalism.
Furthermore, in the present framework, we have
also done away with the “singular nature” of the
particles and, hence, also with the unsatisfactory
dualism of the field (space) and the source particle.
We also have, simultaneously, well-defined laws of
motion (Borel automorphisms) for the field (space)
and also for the well-defined conception of a point
particle (of integrated measure characteristics of a
P-set or an object). Then, the present formalism
is a complete field theory.
However, none of the two notions of location
and momentum is any deficient for a description
of the facts since Heisenberg’s indeterminacy re-
lations are also “explainable” within the present
formalism. This explanation crucially hinges on
the fact that the points of the space B, as single-
ton subsets of the space B, are never the P-sets.
It is only in the sense of associating the measures
integrated over a P-set that the points of the space
B are point particles.
[At this point, we then also note that the Borel
automorphisms of B need not be differentiable
or, for that matter, even continuous. Therefore,
the present considerations also use, for the most
fundamental formalism of physics, a mathemati-
cal structure different than that of the partial dif-
ferential equations. However, the question of the
physical significance of non-differentiable and non-
continuous Borel automorphisms of B is a subject
of independent detailed study.]
Now, any measuring arrangement is conceivable
here only as a Borel automorphism of the under-
lying continuum B. It is therefore clear that the
measurability of any characteristic of a point par-
ticle as defined in the present framework is de-
pendent on the “Borel automorphism” to be used.
But, that Borel automorphism changes the very
P-set or object of measurement.
The “determined or observed” location of a par-
ticle is therefore a different conception here. It
clearly depends on the Borel automorphism to be
used for the measurement. The “observed veloc-
ity or momentum” of a particle is then a concep-
tion dependent on the notion of the physical dis-
tance changing under the action of a Borel auto-
morphism of B. Clearly, the coordination of the
underlying continuum B has nothing whatsoever
to do with the measurability here.
This brings us to some most fundamental issues
of the physical world, those of the physical descrip-
tion, measurement and causality.
Recall what Bohr [4] had put it so succinctly:
The quantum theory is characterized by the ac-
knowledgement of a fundamental limitation in the
classical physical ideas when applied to atomic phe-
nomena. ... the so-called quantum postulate, which
attributes to any atomic process an essential dis-
continuity, or rather individuality, completely for-
eign to the classical theories. ...
Bohr [4] continues: This postulate implies a re-
nunciation as regards the causal spacetime coordi-
nation of atomic processes. Indeed, our usual de-
scription of physical phenomena is based entirely
on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be
observed without disturbing them appreciably. This
appears, for example, clearly in the theory of rel-
ativity, which has been so fruitful for the elucida-
tion of the classical theories. As emphasized by
Einstein, every observation or measurement ulti-
mately rests on the coincidence of two independent
events at the same spacetime point. Just these co-
incidences will not be affected by any differences
which the spacetime coordination of different ob-
servers may exhibit. Now, the quantum postulate
implies that any observation of atomic phenomena
will involve an interaction with the agency of ob-
servation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an inde-
pendent reality in the ordinary physical sense can
neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the
agencies of observation. ...
Indeed, the quantum theory has taught us that
the interaction of an observing mechanism with
the object being observed causes “uncontrollable”
changes to that object of observation. This is an
entirely new element that was not present either in
Newton’s theory or in special relativity. This new
element definitely signifies a fundamental limita-
tion of the related ideas.
To illustrate this above issue, Heisenberg [1] thus
wrote that: In fact, our ordinary description of
nature, and the idea of exact laws, rests on the
assumption that it is possible to observe the phe-
nomena without appreciably influencing them. To
coordinate a definite cause to a definite effect has
sense only when both can be observed without in-
troducing a foreign element disturbing their inter-
relation. The law of causality, because of its very
nature, can only be defined for isolated systems,
and in atomic physics even approximately isolated
systems cannot be observed.
In his exposition of Bohr’s concept of comple-
mentarity, Heisenberg [1] then, rightfully, pointed
out that: Second among the requirements tradi-
tionally imposed on a physical theory is that it must
explain all phenomena as relations between objects
existing in space and time. This requirement has
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suffered gradual relaxation in the course of the de-
velopment of physics.
In this connection, Bohr [4] wrote that: This
situation has far reaching consequences. On one
hand, the definition of the state of a physical sys-
tem, as ordinarily understood, claims the elimina-
tion of all external disturbances. But, in that case,
according to the quantum postulate, any observa-
tion will be impossible, and, above all, the con-
cepts of space and time lose their immediate sense.
On the other hand, if in order to make observa-
tion possible we permit certain interactions with
suitable agencies of measurement, not belonging to
the system, an unambiguous definition of the state
of the system is naturally no longer possible, and
there can be no question of causality in the ordi-
nary sense of the word. ...
He added [4] further that: Just as the relativity
theory has taught us that the convenience of dis-
tinguishing sharply between space and time rests
solely on the smallness of the velocities ordinar-
ily met with compared to the velocity of light, we
learn from the quantum theory that the appropri-
ateness of our usual causal spacetime description
depends entirely upon the small value of the quan-
tum of action as compared to the actions involved
in ordinary sense perceptions.
Heisenberg [1] too had, similarly, stated that:
Although the theory of relativity makes the great-
est of demands on the ability for abstract thought,
still it fulfills the traditional requirements of sci-
ence in so far as it permits a division of the world
into subject and object (observer and observed) and
hence a clear formulation of the law of causality.
This is the very point at which the difficulties of
the quantum theory begin.
Furthermore, Bohr [4] also mentioned: Strictly
speaking, the idea of observation belongs to the
causal spacetime way of description. ... Accord-
ing to the quantum theory, just the impossibility of
neglecting the interaction with the agency of mea-
surement means that every observation introduces
a new uncontrollable element.
Surely, there is absolutely no way of going back
to the newtonian strict causality simultaneously
with its associations of physical properties of ob-
jects and the underlying space.
Now, these references to “the relativity theory”
are clearly directed at special relativity and em-
phasize that the Lorentz transformations involve
space and time coordinates on equal footing in the
4-dimensional Minkowski manifold.
But, these considerations then ignore the fact
that there is, physically speaking, really nothing
sacrosanct about the 4-dimensionality in special
relativity. Then, we also note at this place that no
adequate recognition of Einstein’s and Descartes’s
ideas (about physical matter and geometry) is ev-
ident in these above remarks as well as in re-
lated discussions by Bohr and by Heisenberg, both.
These ideas have definitely changed the newtonian
concept of “all phenomena as relations between ob-
jects existing in space and time” since their concep-
tual framework is based on the inseparable unison
of physical objects and the space - physical objects
are the space and vice versa.
For this last reason, the issues involved herein
may also not be so simple and straightforward as
appears from the above remarks [1, 4]. This situ-
ation forces us to reconsider some contents, while
still maintaining the validity of other contents, of
these remarks [1, 4].
Firstly, it is vital to recognize that the aforemen-
tioned new element has a direct bearing only on
the “observability” of involved quantities but the
ensuing limitation does not apply to the associa-
tion of the properties of a physical body with the
properties of the space. Observability and these
associations are independent issues.
To illustrate this point further, let us consider
that an observer chooses a certain spatial location
as the origin of the coordinate system and intends
to attach spatial labels to other points of the space
with respect to it. To achieve this, the observer
needs to use a measuring rod.
The observer intends to also attach suitable tem-
poral labels to each point of the space. For this
purpose, the observer then needs to place at each
location in the space physical bodies executing pe-
riodic motion as clocks.
But, by the quantum postulate, these concepts
involve intrinsic indeterminacies. Therefore, nei-
ther the origin of the coordinate system nor the
coordinate labels can be determined in a physical
measurement any more accurately than permitted
by Heisenberg’s relevant indeterminacy relation. It
is therefore that the coordination used by an ob-
server is not the same as the coordination of the
underlying continuum.
Then, in our considerations, the Hausdorff met-
ric, and not the pseudo-metric (1), is clearly the
only which is relevant to the coordination used by
an observer. That is to say, the coordination of the
space B has no direct bearing on the coordination
used by an observer.
Furthermore, the association of physical proper-
ties, measures on the P-sets or objects, with the
underlying space, the space B, has nothing what-
soever to do with the “observability” of these prop-
erties by an observer. Observability rests, clearly,
on the (group of) Borel automorphisms of the un-
derlying continuum B. Observability and the asso-
ciation of physical properties with the underlying
space are therefore entirely unrelated issues for our
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considerations here. It is clearly decisive to recog-
nize this independence of these issues.
Now, physical measurement involves the coin-
cidence of two “events” at the same space loca-
tion as far as the coordination of the space B is
concerned and at the same “time” as far as the
“labelling parameter” of the corresponding Borel
automorphism of the space B is concerned. But,
no observer can bypass the natural limits specified
by the indeterminacy relations.
Hence, Einstein’s point that every measurement
rests on the coincidence of two independent events
at the same spacetime point should really be
viewed as a statement about the coordination of
the underlying continuum B. Then, it also follows
that these coincidences will not be affected by the
differences in the spacetime coordination used by
different observers.
Then, Einstein’s arguments [4] about the space-
time coincidence of two events apply in that two in-
dependent events, as far as the coordination of the
underlying continuum is concerned, occur at the
same space point and at the same time. But, Bohr
[4] is equally well justified in pointing out that
the quantum postulate renders “measurability” of
the values of (spacetime) coordinates indetermi-
nate within the natural limits specified by Heisen-
berg’s indeterminacy relations. This dichotomy is
evident in the formalism here.
Presently, it is equally vital to also recognize
that the basic ideas of general relativity, of the
inseparable unison of physical matter and curved
geometry, do not imply any assertion that its co-
ordinates, coordinate differences and even the in-
variant geometric distance are exactly measurable
physical quantities. Then, the concepts of under-
lying curved geometry are independent of those of
physical measurements. The physical meaning at-
tached to the geometric invariant distance is then,
decisively, also lost.
Importantly, the present formalism of dynami-
cal systems on space B follows the “strict deter-
minism” in the obvious sense that the space co-
ordinates map exactly under the action of a Borel
automorphism of the space B.
However, it is equally important to realize that
this is not the same “causality” as that of the new-
tonian physical formulation since the present for-
mulation must necessarily satisfy Heisenberg’s in-
determinacy relations.
In this connection, we note that the strict new-
tonian causality implies that given precise position
and velocity of a particle at a given moment and
all the forces acting on it, we can predict the pre-
cise position and velocity of that particle at any
later moment using appropriate (classical) laws -
Newton’s laws. Then, this newtonian causality is
gone for good with the realization that the quan-
tum postulate [4] must hold always.
In our present formalism, the newtonian causal-
ity would have demanded that the position and the
velocity of a point-particle (definable in the present
formalism as a point of the P-set or an object with
associated integrated measures) be exactly deter-
minable. This is, evidently, not the situation in the
present formalism of dynamical systems on the un-
derlying continuum B.
But, reality independent of any act of observa-
tion, is then ascribable to the phenomena as well
as to the agencies of observation in this formalism.
Since physical objects are the regions of the space
and vice versa, the “existence” of the points of the
space is the “existence” of physical objects. This
“existence” is, obviously, independent of any act
of observation. Objective reality of physical phe-
nomena is then explainable similarly. That this is
doable in a mathematically and physically consis-
tent manner is now evident.
Clearly, the Moon of the Mother Earth then “ex-
ists” whether we choose to look at it or not! But,
evidently now, by choosing to look at it, we do also
change the gross or average physical characteristics
of the Moon as well!
Furthermore, to coordinate a definite cause to a
definite effect has appropriate sense in the present
formalism. The Borel automorphism of the space
B is the cause behind a certain effect on the P-set
or an object. It is therefore not that the idea of
exact laws rests entirely on the assumption that
it is possible to observe the phenomena without
appreciably influencing them.
Then, the present formalism of dynamical sys-
tems on the underlying continuum B allows us a
clear division of the world into act of observation
and observed. It is this subject-object division that
is behind the law of causality of the present for-
malism. But, resolutions of the difficulties of the
quantum are already incorporated into the present
formalism in that the associations of physical prop-
erties with the underlying space B embody the in-
determinacy relations.
The present formalism, of the dynamical systems
of the underlying continuum B, is then, already, a
unification of the quantum theory and the general
theory of relativity.
[By the “General Theory of Relativity,” we of
course do not mean here the standard formula-
tion in terms of the Einstein makeshift field equa-
tions. We, rather, mean here the underlying ideas
of the inseparable unison of physical objects and
the space which necessarily require the generality
of coordinate transformations.
Similarly, by the “quantum theory,” we do not
mean here the standard formulation in terms of the
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Ψ-function but only the underlying ideas implied
by Bohr’s quantum postulate.
It is a separate and important issue as to how
one would recover these standard formulations
from the present framework of dynamical systems
of the space B.]
In what follows, we now provide further heuristic
reasons as to why this unification can be considered
“natural” in a definite sense.
Recall that the standard formalism of the quan-
tum theory based on Schro¨dinger’s Ψ-function pro-
vides us, essentially, the means of calculating the
probability of a physical event involving physical
object(s). It presupposes that we have specified,
say, the lagrangian or, equivalently, certain phys-
ical characteristics of the problem under consid-
eration. Evidently, this is necessary to determine
the Ψ-function using which we then make (prob-
abilistic) predictions regarding that physical phe-
nomenon under consideration.
At this stage, we then note the following funda-
mental limitation of any theory that uses proba-
bilistic considerations. (This limitation is clearly
recognizable for statistical mechanics in relation to
the newtonian theory.)
The pivotal point here is that the method of
calculating the probability, say, of the outcome of
the toss of a coin, per se, cannot provide us the
physical description or characterization of what we
mean by that coin, whose certain intrinsic prop-
erties must be specified before hand. That is to
say, the method of obtaining the probability of the
outcome of its toss is irrelevant to certain intrinsic
properties of the coin.
Therefore, methods of the standard quantum
theory, these leading us to the probability of the
outcome of a physical experiment about a cho-
sen physical object, cannot provide us the means
of “specifying” certain intrinsic properties of that
physical body. This fact, precisely, appears to be
the reason as to why we had to specify by hand the
values of the mass and the charge in various oper-
ators of the non-relativistic as well as relativistic
versions of the quantum theory.
The “origins” of “intrinsic” properties of physi-
cal bodies cannot then be explainable on the basis
of the Ψ-function or by employing the standard
methods of the quantum theory.
It is then equally decisive to recognize also that
this intrinsic limitation of probabilistic considera-
tions cannot, in any manner, be circumvented by
redefining probability [29].
Essentially therefore, the standard formulation
of the quantum theory presupposes then that we
have specified certain intrinsic properties of physi-
cal object(s) under consideration. Hence, the ori-
gin of such properties is to be sought elsewhere
and not within the formalism of the quantum the-
ory. [This is then also why the formalism of quan-
tum theory as well its inherently probabilistic con-
siderations cannot provide the universal basis for
physics, in general.]
If not within the standard formalism of the
quantum theory then, how else can we “explain”
the “origin” of the intrinsic properties of material
bodies such as its inertia?
In this connection, it is but clear that, in any
such explanation, we will have to employ the con-
cept of the space which has been the basis of physi-
cal theories since Newton’s times. This is necessary
not just for the reasons of being able to connect
with the ideas of the past but also for the fact that
no other avenues appear to be available. Then,
Descartes’s and Einstein’s ideas of the inseparable
unison of physical bodies and the properties of the
space become open for exploration.
Of course, there cannot be “source particles”
as separate or fundamentally independent physi-
cal entities in a complete field theory. Particles
can only be represented as special regions of field
energy in the space and, as per Descartes’s and
Einstein’s ideas, the space itself is the field. The
properties of the space are then the properties of
material bodies and vice versa. These conceptions,
together with certain physically motivated obser-
vations related to the mass-scale or the length-scale
independence of the space, then lead us uniquely
to the pseudo-metric space B.
We are then led to the approach of measures
definable on the pseudo-metric 3-continuum B to
represent points of the continuum as particles with
properties as the integrated measures defined on
the corresponding P-sets or objects. Except in
this sense of the points of the P-sets or objects
of the space B, it is not clear as to whether we
can, in any other alternative manner, “mathemat-
ically” recover the non-singular, physical, notion
of a particle to represent material bodies. In the
absence of any other alternatives, these concepts
related to dynamical systems on the space B then
become logical compulsion.
In conclusion, from the considerations of the
present paper, conceptions related to dynamical
systems on the spaceB appear logically inevitable.
The unification of the conceptions of the quantum
theory and those of the general theory of relativity
as embodied in the formalism of the dynamical sys-
tems on the space B, then, becomes natural from
this point of view.
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